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The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research and the
Principle of "Nothing is Lost"
Gene Outka*
Hype tempts us all. It would be naive to exempt scientists from sometimes
overstating the promise of their research. Early claims about what gene therapy
would accomplish, for example, were arguably exaggerated and eroded public
confidence. Yet claims about what stem cell research may accomplish belong in
a class by themselves. The general public is now convinced that something
momentous is occurring.1 Both professional and popular publications register the
excitement that scientists evidence. This research, it is routinely said, will not
only expand significantly what we know about cellular life, but it will also bring
dazzling clinical benefits. Those who suffer from Alzheimer's disease,
Parkinson's disease, and others are regularly identified as eventual beneficiaries.
Because these possibilities are now widely accepted as truly feasible, researchers
secure vaster amounts of material support all the while.
Whether these claims too will prove exaggerated awaits research efforts that
are still in their early stages.2 In the case of embryonic stem cell research,
consider this sobering report: "To date, no therapeutic applications of embryo-
derived cells have been demonstrated, and only one preliminary human trial has
been approved by the FDA (though it has yet to begin)."3 Some scientists
acknowledge with an honesty I admire that they are still years away from broadly
* Ph.D., Dwight Professor of Philosophy & Christian Ethics, Yale University. Adapted from Gene
Outka's The Ethics of Human Stem Cell Research. KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS JOURNAL 12:2
(2002), 175-213. © 2002 The Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted with permission of The
Johns Hopkins University Press. As published in the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and
Ethics, this Article is only available in the hard copy publication. For permissions requests and
other copyright inquiries related to this Article only, please contact The Johns Hopkins University
Press directly.
1. For one early, engaging indication, see Gregg Easterbrook, Medical Evolution, NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1999, at 18. For a comparative survey, see Matthew Weed, Discourse on
Embryo Science and Human Cloning in the United States and Great Britain: 1984-2002, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 802 (2005). For a broad survey of scientific, ethical, and religious issues, see THE
STEM CELL CONTROVERSY: DEBATING THE ISSUES (Michael Ruse & Christopher Pynes eds., 2d ed.
2006).
2. Sharon Begley, Reality Check on an Embryonic Debate, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 2007, at 52;
Maureen L. Condic, The Basics About Stem Cells, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2002, at 30.
3. Yuval Levin, Biotech: What To Expect, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2009, at 17, 18.
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applicable therapies. We long for such benefits, of course, and most of us sense a
genuinely other-regarding motive at work among those who make claims about
benefits. That is, the prospect such research affords for bringing concrete relief to
numerous human sufferers motivates scientists to engage in it. We discern and
respect this motive, although we do well to acknowledge that less altruistic
considerations, such as a search for funding and profits, sometimes operate as
well.
This Article takes general stock of moral judgments about embryonic stem
cell research in particular and offers one specific resolution. It canvasses a
spectrum of value judgments on sources, complicity, and "adult" stem cells.4 It
proposes to extend the principle of "nothing is lost" to current debates. This
extension links historic discussions of the ethics of direct killing with
unprecedented possibilities that in vitro fertilization procedures yield. The
creation of embryos solely for research purposes should be resisted, yet research
on "excess" embryos is permissible by virtue of an appeal to the "nothing is lost"
principle.
The ethical controversies surrounding this research press chiefly in two
directions: 1) the other-regarding motive to benefit human sufferers, and 2) the
moral status of the embryo. Even as we praise the motive, we confront
complicating moral questions about according this motive utter priority. Should
research that accents benefits to human sufferers trump all other considerations
as it seeks to secure these benefits? What of embryos themselves? Should we,
without a second thought, reduce their value totally to their importance for
relieving the suffering of third parties? May a readiness to do anything that we
please with and to embryos be acceptably other-regarding after all? What other
moral considerations count and how much should they count? I approach these
questions with lenses through which I see a more encompassing diagnosis of
ourselves. Two basic generalizations about us that derive from this diagnosis
influence my reflections in what follows.
First, we are morally capable creatures, accountable beings. We should
assume responsibility for what we are doing, and we go wrong when we seek to
deny our agency. Second, we are creatures who can exalt ourselves inordinately,
in ways that flout God and manipulate others. This condition is called sin and
moral evil in many religious communities. To be tempted to usurp and to do
injustice is endemic to human life as we know it. In my own identity as an
4. I mention but do not focus here on alternative sources of stem cells: adult, umbilical cord,
placental, amniotic, and others. See infra note 23. To restrict attention to the embryonic is justified
because this source raises distinctive moral considerations and because many still hold that - except
for the practical difficulties created by ethical controversies - it is the best for research purposes
among the alternatives. Further, most of the moral considerations I identify require me to
distinguish between embryonic stem cells on the one hand, and adult and other alternative-source
stem cells on the other.
IX:2 (2009)
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Augustinian Christian, I take it that we are continually in danger and that
everything is corruptible.5 If this is right, we should expect that embryonic stem
cell research is itself not immune to pressures that may usurp and do injustice. In
short, we are contending in the case of such research with novel opportunities
and challenges, and with permanent capabilities and dangers. In what follows I
characterize moral controversies that surround embryonic stem cell research in
Part I; I assess them for myself in Part II; and I offer concluding remarks in
closing.
I. RECURRING ETHICAL CONTROVERSIES
I focus on three points where value judgments collide: the status of the fetus
and of the embryo; the question of complicity, where research depends on
someone destroying a fetus or an embryo; and the alternative of concentrating on
stem cells found in adults. Particular evaluations of these three issues tend to
cohere internally. I review a spectrum of rival value judgments that pertain to
each point.6
A. Views on the Right
By views on the right, I refer mostly to Richard M. Doerflinger, who defends
in lucid prose Vatican instruction on human procreation. Yet we should not
suppose that only Roman Catholics reach the judgments I describe; many
5. See Gene Outka, Augustinianism and Common Morality, in PROSPECTS FOR A COMMON
MORALITY 114 (Gene Outka & John P. Reeder, Jr. eds., 1993).
6. These judgments recur in various religious traditions; they are by no means confined to
Christianity. Because many Jewish thinkers take the moral standing of the early fetus as
subordinate to the mother (in cases of pregnancy following rape, for example, her pain comes first),
and because they nevertheless want to promote life and reduce suffering, they may laud stem cell
research generally and embryonic stem cell research specifically. See Ellen N. Dorff, Testimony of
Rabbi Ellen N. Dorff Ph.D., in 3 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN
STEM CELL RESEARCH, at C-1 (2000), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/
nbac/stemcell3.pdf; Moshe Dovid Tendler, Testimony of Rabbi Moshe Dovid Tendler, Ph.D., in
NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra, at H-l; Laurie Zoloth, Testimony of Laurie Zoloth,
Ph.D., in NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra, at J-1. Less reflection on stem cell research
appears in the Islamic tradition to date. But see Abdulaziz Sachedina, Testimony of Abdulaziz
Sachedina, Ph.D., in NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra, at G-1. Views on abortion prove
complex, moreover; both conservative and more permissive judgments appear. For one instructive
survey, see Marion Holmes Katz, The Problem of Abortion in Classical Sunni Fiqh, in ISLAMIC
ETHICS OF LIFE: ABORTION, WAR, AND EUTHANASIA 25 (Jonathan Brockopp ed., 2003). See also
Donna Lee Bowen, Contemporary Muslim Ethics of Abortion, in ISLAMIC ETHICS OF LIFE:
ABORTION, WAR, AND EUTHANASIA, supra, at 51; Vardit Rispler-Chaim, The Right Not To Be Born:
Abortion of the Disadvantaged Fetus in Contemporary Fatwas, in ISLAMIC ETHICS OF LIFE:
ABORTION, WAR, AND EUTHANASIA, supra, at 81.
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evangelical Protestants and (Eastern) Orthodox Christians, for example, do as
well.7
First, the status of fetuses and embryos. Doerflinger considers the moral
status of the human embryo in light of the historic conviction that each human
individual has basic and equal human worth. No differences in talents or other
conditions, including the stage of embryonic development, should overturn this
evaluation. If we take the evaluation to heart, we infer that no one should be
treated, exhaustively and without remainder, as a means or instrument. "The
human individual, called into existence by God and made in the divine image and
likeness.., must always be treated as an end in himself or herself, not merely as
a means to other ends .... ,8 It is cogent to infer inviolability too. To kill the
innocent deliberately and directly is the prime instance of attacking such
inviolability. Fetuses and embryos are assuredly innocent. Doerflinger sees both
abortion and the destruction of embryos as treating fetuses and embryos merely
as means to other ends, and as going against inviolability.
Second, complicity. Doerflinger assesses various arguments about
complicity. Here, certain differences between abortion and the destruction of
embryos do appear, but they give no comfort to the advocates of research on
embryos.
1) Doerflinger grants that a researcher who uses fetal tissue is not
necessarily a supporter of the decision to request or perform an abortion.
2) He refuses to say the same, however, about those who derive and use
stem cells from embryos. "Here those who harvest and use the cells are
necessarily complicit in the destruction of the embryo." 9
3) He rejects as incoherent any claim that governmental funding of
research on embryonic stem cells does not involve complicity in the
destruction of embryos as long as researchers did not participate directly
in such destruction.
7. See Demetrios Demopulos, Testimony of Father Demetrios Demopulos, Ph.D., in NAT'L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at B-I; Gilbert C. Meilaender, Jr., Testimony of
Gilbert C. Meilaender, Jr., Ph.D., in NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at E-1.
8. Richard M. Doerflinger, The Ethics of Funding Embryonic Stem Cell Research: A Catholic
Viewpoint, 9 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 137, 138 (1999); see also Gene Outka, Respect for Persons,
in THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 541 (James F. Childress & John
Macquarrie eds., 1986); Gene Outka, Universal Love and Impartiality, in THE LOVE
COMMANDMENTS: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (Edmund N. Santurri &
William Werpehowski eds., 1992).
9. Doerflinger, supra note 8, at 141.
IX:2 (2009)
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4) He also criticizes the argument that derivation of stem cells from
"spare" embryos donated by fertility clinics differs morally from using
embryos created solely for research purposes, and that only the latter uses
embryos as a mere means to other peoples' ends.
Third, the alternative of adult stem cells. Doerflinger, like many who
endorse respect for human life from the earliest stages,10 accents the advances
that researchers have made in their work on adult stem cells. He also stresses a
major advantage on which most agree: using adult cells avoids possible tissue
rejection by treating a patient with his or her own cells. In the years since his
article was published, however, claims have waxed and waned about the benefits
of adult stem cell research.
B. Views in the Middle
First, the status of fetuses and embryos. We find a more liberal argument
within the Catholic tradition and elsewhere that favors embryonic stem cell
research. It requires us to distinguish between conception and individuation.
Margaret Farley accepts this argument. For her and a number of other Catholic
moral theologians, the human embryo is not considered
in its earliest stages (prior to the development of the primitive streak or to
implantation) to constitute an individualized human entity with the settled
inherent potential to become a human person. The moral status of the embryo
is, therefore (in this view), not that of a person; and its use for certain kinds of
research can be justified. (Since it is, however, a form of human life, some
respect is due it-for example, it should not be bought and sold.)"
10. See, e.g., Demopulos, supra note 7, at B-4 (discussing beliefs of the Greek Orthodox
Church).
11. Margaret A. Farley, Roman Catholic Views on Research Involving Human Embryonic Stem
Cells, in NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at D-1, D-4. In addition to the
testimony already cited by Farley, Meilaender, and Demopulos, other testimony given to the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission and published in 2000 displays the diversity of views
within religious traditions. See sources cited supra notes 6-7; see also Edmund D. Pellegrino, in
NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at F-1. While certain Catholic moral
theologians hold divergent views on the moral status of the human embryo, the official teaching of
the Catholic Church is that it is morally illicit to produce or use living human embryos for the
preparation of embryonic stem cells. See Pontifical Academy for Life, Declaration on the
Production and Scientific and Therapeutic Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells, Aug. 25, 2000,
http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/pontifical-academies/acdlife/documents/rc-pa-acdlife doc_20
000824_cellule-staminalien.html; CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION
DIGNITAs PERSONAE ON CERTAIN BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS (2008), available at
http://www.usccb.org/comm/Dignitaspersonae/Dignitas.Personae.pdf.
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Farley commends certain safeguards: for instance, donors may not specify who is
to receive stem cells for therapeutic treatment, and an "absolute barrier" should
be maintained between research and reproductive cloning. In this more
permissive view, not everything is thereby permitted.
Second, complicity. Those who occupy positions in the middle may disagree
about the moral standing of fetuses. Many, however, refuse to equate the
destruction of embryos who already exist (but who will either be frozen in
perpetuity or discarded) with the intentional creation and destruction of embryos
solely to benefit third parties. Complicity in the former instance appears to be
morally less grave. The decisive role here is played by those responsible for the
existence of embryos in the first place and for electing subsequently to freeze
them or discard them. Rather than initiating the creation or destruction of
embryos, researchers react only after the responsible parties have reached their
fateful determinations. The numbers of such embryos, effectively bereft of
prospects, are vast. Some estimate that approximately 400,000 frozen spare
embryos now languish in in vitro fertilization clinics. 12 The majority are no
longer wanted or claimed by those who once needed them in order to have a
child. Yet they retain final authority. Unless excess embryos are expressly
donated, they will never be implanted. They will be discarded. Judging
complicity should reckon with this datum accordingly.
Third, the alternative of adult stem cells. Those who occupy middle places
across the spectrum generally accept (though sometimes reluctantly) a verdict
that many scientists have reached. Stem cell therapies deriving from adults are
necessary, but not yet sufficient, if we want to obtain the various cell types that
clinically important areas of research require.
C. Views on the Left
First, the status offetuses and embryos. Those who stand on the left side of
the spectrum characteristically deny that the value accorded to pre-viable fetuses
should ever override pregnant women's choices (for whatever reason) to
terminate their pregnancies. Here I refer mostly to the works of John C.
Robertson.' 3 Robertson judges that to attribute basic and equal human worth to
each human individual requires more than the presence of cells that have the
potential to develop into the person. He refuses to say, however, that because
embryos lack moral status in their own right we may do anything at all with
them; they are not "means" to this extent. For example, we may not use them
12. Anne Drapkin Lyerly & Ruth R. Faden, Willingness To Donate Frozen Embryos for Stem
Cell Research, 317 SCIENCE 46 (2007).
13. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Ethics and Policy in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 9
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 109 (1999). For a similar view on the left, see BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE
BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES (1992).
IX:2 (2009)
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"for toxicology testing of cosmetics or buying and selling them."' 4 One should
deny intrinsic value to embryos and still accord them "symbolic" value and
"'special respect' because of their potential, when placed in a uterus, to become
fetuses and eventually to be born. '" 5 This symbolic value should nevertheless be
trumped when we pursue a good scientific or medical end that we cannot pursue
by other means. The value is thus extremely thin; it does not come to much.
Second, complicity. Robertson thinks that any distinction between the
derivation and the use of embryonic stem cells does not survive critical
scrutiny.' 6 Researchers who use stem cells derived from embryos are complicit in
their destruction, regardless of whether they participate directly in the destructive
act. Moreover, those who support the use of cells from spare embryos from in
vitro fertilization clinics should also support the creation of embryos for the
purpose of research. In both cases, embryos do become a means to address the
needs of others, once one decides to use them in research. Robertson displays an
ironic affinity with Doerflinger on this matter. Both insist on an either/or choice,
but draw the opposite normative conclusions. Either one should stop opposing
the creation and destruction of embryos for research purposes only (in
Robertson's view), or one should oppose not only the creation and destruction of
embryos for research purposes, but also the research on spare embryos from in
vitro fertilization clinics (in Doerflinger's view). On this point, both the left and
right perspectives exert pressure on the middle point of view.
Third, the alternative of adult stem cells. Those who take Robertson's
position can only prefer limiting research to adult stem cells if such a limit will in
fact yield superior therapeutic benefits for members of society generally. They
deny that the benefit of such a limit has been demonstrated.
17
1I. MORAL ASSESSMENTS
I commend as a normative point of departure the conviction that Doerflinger
cites: "the human individual, called into existence by God and made in the divine
image and likeness, . . . must always be treated as an end in himself or herself,
not merely as a means to other ends ....,,1 8 Many hold this conviction, not only
those on the right. To regard each person for his or her own sake, as one who is
irreducibly valuable, authorizes a sphere of inviolability and heightens sensitivity
14. Robertson, supra note 13, at 117
15. Id. at 118.
16. Id. at 113.
17. A fourth point where controversies recur has two levels. The first concerns controversies
about federal funding of stem cell research. The second level concerns controversies about the
absence of coordination between research permitted in the public and private sectors. I find it
disquieting that research possibilities lack any sort of society-wide oversight.
18. Doerflinger, supra note 8, at 138.
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to the multiple ways we may go wrong. An approach that affirms inviolability
and abjures domination captures deeply important commitments, which direct
moral attention along lines I take to be permanently valid.
Many likewise draw on the language of ends and means to evaluate cases of
"killing and saving.' ' 9 Murder is arguably the quintessential instance of going
wrong. Those who murder arrogate to themselves a position of false superiority.
They usurp or perversely imitate God, who alone is the "Author of life and
death." Murderers do their victims incommensurable harm; in depriving victims
of life, they reduce their victims to "mere means" to their own aims and projects.
Is it coherent to claim that actions that destroy embryos, such as abortion and
embryonic stem cell research, are morally indistinguishable from murder?
Posing so blunt a question concentrates our thoughts. Yet it also encourages
an unfortunate tendency to restrict evaluative possibilities to a single either/or.
Either we judge abortion and the destruction of embryos to be transparent
instances of treating fetuses and embryos as mere means to other ends. Or we
judge abortion and embryonic stem cell research as morally indifferent actions in
themselves, to be evaluated solely in terms of the benefits they bring to others. I
reject what I take to be this simplifying restriction.
My own view is that the most fitting place to inhabit is a particular region in
the middle. Unlike that of conservatives, my view does not extend the prohibition
of murder to the prohibition of abortion and embryonic stem cell research.20 And
unlike that of liberals, my view ascribes an importance to fetuses and embryos
that cannot be reduced to mere symbolism or the benefits that research on them
may bring to third parties. This view can be illustrated on its own terms and in
connection with formidable arguments on the right and left. The most distinctive
example of the view I advocate is a simultaneous allowance of research on
"excess" in vitro embryos and a rejection of the creation-for example, through
research cloning-of embryos for research.
A. From the Right: Specificity and Stringency
The tradition of moral reflection that shapes conclusions on the right
elevates two considerations that those in the middle should heed as well. One
consideration is moral specificity. Murder is prohibited, but not all killing is
murder. How shall we discriminate? We should not do so by writing morally
evaluative references into the characterization of what murder is. The prohibition
of killing in the Decalogue is construed more precisely to mean that we should
19. See, e.g., JOHN P. REEDER, JR., KILLING AND SAVING: ABORTION, HUNGER, AND WAR 58-66,
164-68 (1996).
20. Though in the latter case I distinguish between engaging in research on cryopreserved
embryos and intentionally creating and destroying embryos for research, it is the former whose
meaning differs from murder. See infra note 30.
IX:2 (2009)
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not intentionally kill innocent human life. This construal specifies what "murder"
is. It is a delimited action-kind. The judgment that murder in this sense is wrong
purports to be true yet is not a tautology. It is the judgment under scrutiny, and it
remains possible to dispute it. To construe more precisely the prohibition of
killing introduces on the one hand a certain flexibility. It helps to make sense of
society's organized efforts to provide security for its citizens against arbitrary,
unprovoked, or otherwise unjust assaults on life and limb, and to accommodate
policing, courts of law, and soldiering. Yet on the other hand, this construal
limits flexibility. When we meet cases that fall within its range of applicability,
as we surely do, we may not then redescribe them at will. Instead, we
acknowledge the moral features of the case we confront and either condemn or
seek special justification or mitigation.
A second consideration is moral stringency. To reiterate an ancient question:
may we (ever) do evil to achieve good?2' When we meet cases that fall within the
prohibition's range of applicability, we face two choices: the prohibition against
killing as precisely construed possesses either absolute or prima facie authority
in any circumstance to which it applies. Unless we understand how the
prohibition against killing is construed, and that it may be accorded absolute
authority, we fail to grasp where and why many on the right judge abortion and
embryonic stem cell research as they do, and where and why many on the left
demur.
Those on the right judge that the prohibition of murder extends to fetuses
and embryos. Both are innocent, and aborting a fetus and disaggregating an
embryo are direct actions that kill. Whether death is strictly intended is a more
complicated question I think in the case of abortion. As for "human life," the last
part of the specified prohibition, those on the right maintain that each human
entity, from the time of conception, is irreducibly valuable. Indeed, each is
judged to have an equally protectable status. If embryos are currently genderless
and removed from the naked eye, they differ from the rest of us in that they await
implantation, growth, and subsequent entry into the world of social interaction.
But they contain the requisite genetic information that renders each unique.22
And all of us began at this stage. Why then discriminate? Does our self-
absorption blind us to injustices we may commit because at present we enjoy
superior power? Assuredly, fetuses and embryos cannot now fight back on their
own behalf. Yet none of us could at the point of our origins. To intervene and
destroy fetuses and embryos palpably instrumentalizes them for the sake of those
who are presently stronger. We do well to remember what our parents did, and
that we are grateful for what they did, when we evaluate abortion and embryonic
stem cell research.
Those on the right go next from specificity to stringency. We should make
21. See DOING EVIL To ACHIEVE GOOD (Richard A. McCormick & Paul Ramsey eds., 1978).
22. Andrew Sullivan, Only Human, NEW REPUBLIC, July 30, 2001, at 8.
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others' ends our own, provided that these ends are morally permissible.
Violating the prohibition against killing as precisely construed is an
impermissible end. We may not do or approve this evil, even when it achieves
good. For we should always relate any benefits we aim to secure to what we are
prepared to do to obtain them. We do best to consider first what we do and
forbear, and not simply what will happen, and to live within the absolute limits
that the prohibition against murder sets for us.
B. In the Middle: When "Nothing is Lost"
I have identified arguments from the right that I find formidable. Indeed, I
think that what constitutes a human individual, and where his or her innocence
still incontestably obtains, starts at conception. That embryos possess the
requisite genetic information rendering each unique suffices to regard each as
irreducibly valuable. To withhold such regard until the possibility of twinning is
past, and to disqualify all embryos from this regard rather than include any
resultant twins within its reach as well, seems to me to fall victim to greater
arbitrariness. And I worry that when we possess superior power, we are tempted
toward injustices that we decry when we lack power and commit when we enjoy
it. Why, then, do I not simply accept these arguments without further ado?
Two lines of further argument move me from the right to the "right of
middle." They prevent my saying that abortion and embryonic stem cell research
are morally indistinguishable from murder. The first is an argument from
"potentiality" that I discuss in detail elsewhere.23 I now propose to invoke and
23. GENE OUTKA, THE ETHICS OF LOVE AND THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION, SECOND ANNUAL
JAMES C. SPALDING MEMORIAL LECTURE 8-10 (1999) (printed in booklet form by the School of
Religion, University of Iowa). In brief, I identify respects in which debates about abortion and
debates about stem cell research converge and diverge. I also indicate how such debates pressure
those in the middle in contrary directions. For example, some are disposed to be more permissive
about embryonic stem cell research than about abortion for these reasons: a) Prior to implantation,
we may distinguish conception from individuation, b) after implantation, the fetus is indeed a
"power underway," who left to self-elaborating processes is likely to become "one of us." Abortion
actively intervenes to terminate "a force that is there," and has the burden of proof, whereas an
embryo must still be implanted, and until it is, we cannot describe it as now a self-elaborating
power underway. Others are disposed to be less permissive about embryonic stem cell research
than about abortion, reasoning that abortion may involve bona fide conflicts between two entities
who are both ends in themselves, whereas embryonic stem cell research is morally simpler. It
concerns only one such entity about whom we can say with certainty, here and now, that the action
we take, disaggregation, causes incommensurable harm. That third parties may benefit from the
research subsequently done, is an outcome for which we fervently hope. But such benefit lies in the
future. It does not lend itself to similarly determinate judgment. And we cannot gainsay the
possibility that it may be attained without taking any lethal step, e.g., through research on other,
morally unambiguous sources of stem cells (from adults, umbilical cord blood, amniotic fluid, and
IX:2 (2009)
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extend a second argument: the nothing is lost principle. I first learned of this
principle from Paul Ramsey. While he was committed to an absolute prohibition
against murder as the intentional killing of innocent life, he was prepared to
attach two exempting conditions to it. One may directly kill when two conditions
obtain: 1) the innocent will die in any case, and 2) other innocent life will be
saved. 4 These two conditions stipulate what nothing is lost means. They
originally extend to parity-conflicts, where one physical life collides directly and
immediately with another physical life, and we cannot save both. I will argue that
it is correct to view embryos in reproductive clinics who are bound either to be
discarded or frozen in perpetuity as innocent lives who will die in any case, and
those third parties with Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and other diseases as other
innocent lives who may be saved, or at least helped, by virtue of research on such
embryos. I grant that this extension stretches the nothing is lost principle toward
the outer limits of its application. For I defend the extension as a move to the
effect that 1) nothing more is lost, and 2) less is lost, or at least, someone may be
saved, or immensely helped (when clinical applications are attained). One reason
it is worth considering is that we face a particular instance of a general
phenomenon, namely, that novel developments arise, for which no clear
precedents suffice to guide us in a wholly straightforward way. We should seek
both to extend traditional moral commitments and to incorporate new
developments as cogently as we can. To labor the obvious, some of the
controversies we are examining only made sense after the age of in vitro
fertilization dawned. It stands behind us, amplifying questions about "end" and
"means" that our forebears could not foresee. Unless we are prepared to
repudiate in vitro fertilization as such, so that we sympathize with infertile
couples but refuse them a right to overcome their condition by any means that
science and their financial resources make available, we must take the moral
measure of these new possibilities.
In the instance before us, I sympathize with the plight of infertility but am
disquieted by the way in vitro fertilization is practiced in our culture.25 But
rightly or wrongly, "excess" embryos are a tenacious datum, for they are a result
of the practice as it currently exists. I welcome the day when such necessity
vanishes, and welcome in the meantime "adopting" mothers willing to implant
other possibilities discussed in PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF
HUMAN PLURIPOTENT STEM CELLS 8 (2005), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/
white-paper/alternative sourceswhite-paper.pdf).
24. PAUL RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE: How SHALL MODERN WAR BE
CONDUCTED JUSTLY? 171-91 (1961).
25. Sondra Wheeler led me to see that the normative position I defend requires a critical
assessment of in vitro fertilization as currently practiced in the United States, and I thank her for
perceptive counsel.
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26embryos when the genetic couple consents. Not to welcome these things belies
the claim that embryos as well as fetuses are irreducibly valuable. Nevertheless,
embryos in appreciable numbers have now been discarded or frozen in
perpetuity. They will die, unimplanted, in any case. Nothing more will be lost by
their becoming subjects of research. Again, it is the absence of prospects of these
innocents that partly extends the first exempting condition. It is the enhancement
of prospects to other innocent life that partly extends the second exempting
condition. Less will be lost, or at least, someone may benefit. These judgments
taken together summarize the case I wish to make.
I say "partly." I do not say "wholly" and certainly not "transparently." The
case for extension I put forward shows both continuities and discontinuities with
prior judgments on the ethics of direct killing. I take the prior judgments
seriously and extend them to novel possibilities as far as I can. But I
acknowledge that the present debates attest to a moral space embryonic stem cell
research occupies that is to a degree unprecedented. Let me give two examples of
continuities and discontinuities.
First, consider this point of continuity. My extension goes so far, and no
further. It includes embryos conceived to enhance fertility, but who will never be
implanted. It excludes embryos created exclusively for research-as in research
cloning-where we intentionally create them, and embrace their disaggregation
as part of what we do. This limited extension accords with the timbre of nothing
is lost in that we encounter circumstances we did not initiate and that we wish
were otherwise. That we contemplate doing repellent things that we would not do
for their own sake indicates that intentional killing was not "part of our plan"
from the start. This timbre matters, yet a difference presents itself even here. The
parity-conflict cases assume a contingent disaster that no one intends or foresees,
26. It is important to qualify any generalization that the creation of spare embryos is endemic
to in vitro fertilization procedures as such. Consider the case of Germany since the passage of the
1990 Embryo Protection Act. See Gesetz zum Shutz von Embryonen [Act for Protection of
Embryos], Dec. 19, 1990, BGBI. I, 69 at 2746 (F.R.G); Henning M. Beier & Jacques 0. Beckman,
German Embryo Protection Act (October 24, 1990), 6 HuM. REPROD. 605 (1991). Germany allows
during an in vitro fertilization procedure only the number of embryos to be developed beyond the
pronucleus stage that will later be transferred. And three is the maximum number of transfers
permitted. The striking result is that Germany faces no "plight" of excess embryos. To be sure,
there is a drawback. Success rates are lower than they are in the United States. Nevertheless, I
conclude two things. First, the normative position I espouse here effectively pushes closer toward
the policies that Germany follows. These would require, however, a degree of regulation that is
needed but missing in the United States. Second, this same normative position requires that I attend
to the large number of excess embryos that exist already in the United States and in certain other
countries. Their "plight" is a fait accompli. The "nothing is lost" appeal that I invoke pertains
chiefly to their plight. To ignore the existence of these excess embryos, to fail to reflect on their
significance, would subtly belittle the moral quandaries they pose. I am indebted to Sabine
Hermission for information about policies in Germany.
IX:2 (2009)
12
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol9/iss3/7
"NOTHING is LOST"
nor is it made part of any established procedure. "Excess" embryos are
foreseeable and endemic to the in vitro fertilization procedure to date. At a
minimum, we foresee this. Still, we intend in performing the procedure to
alleviate infertility, not to create embryos for research. Thus a significant
continuity holds, despite this difference.
Second, consider this point of discontinuity. The nothing is lost principle, as
originally formulated, is narrower and more exact than an extension to the novel
case of unimplanted embryos can be. In parity-conflict cases that goad us to
articulate the nothing is lost principle in the first place, unless we directly kill
one, we cannot save the other, and this allows us to claim that we would save
both if we could. In cases of unimplanted embryos, we face no similar temporal
and causal limits. No other party will directly and immediately die if we elect to
save embryos by freezing them. Any "conflict" is much further removed and
comparatively indeterminate, plainly from parity-conflict cases, and arguably
from abortion decisions more generally.
C. From the Left: Derivation and Use, and Ends and Means
As argued above, Doerflinger on the right and Robertson on the left defend
an either/or dichotomy that I in the middle reject. They hold respectively that
either we should oppose both the creation and destruction of embryos for
research purposes and the research on spare embryos from in vitro fertilization
clinics, or we should stop opposing the creation and destruction of embryos for
research purposes only. I develop my view further in relation to two
considerations that Robertson and those on the left raise.
Derivation and use: As noted previously in the discussion of "complicity,"
Robertson makes two claims that we should not conflate. He contends first that
the distinction between derivation and use is chimerical. Researchers are
complicit in destroying embryos when they use stem cells derived from them,
whether or not they engage in the actual destroying themselves. So far, I agree.
The earlier NIH Guidelines promulgated during the Clinton Administration
27
split the difference, perhaps for political reasons, to promote civil peace by not
ignoring conservatives' concerns altogether, but funding research all the same.
Second, Robertson contends that if one supports research on embryos obtained as
"spares" from in vitro fertilization clinics, one should also support creating and
destroying embryos for the purpose of research. For embryos do become a "mere
means," once we decide to use them in research. I think we may compatibly
accept his first contention and reject his second. And if I am right to extend in a
qualified way the nothing is lost principle, we have important reasons to reject
the second.
27. See National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000).
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Ends and means: Reasons based on ends and means focus on the status we
ascribe to embryos, and on how we interpret the injunction to treat persons as
ends in themselves. Robertson holds, along with many others, that embryos are
too rudimentary to have moral status in their own right. He ascribes "symbolic"
value to them (for example, they may not be bought and sold), but states that they
lack "intrinsic" value. The account of potentiality I offer elsewhere 28 and of
irreducible value offered above does ascribe status to them in their own right.
Potentiality is more than mere possibility. It is a power underway, and more so
with fetuses than with embryos. Yet in both cases potentiality includes existent
capacities to acquire in the future various characteristics typically attributed to
those who "bear the human countenance"-e.g., self-awareness, personal
accountability, and conscious relations with other human beings. I intend
potentiality to be robust enough, in the case of both fetuses and embryos, to resist
the view that fetal life and embryonic life lack any weight as soon as they
conflict with other interests. Without such resistance, we reduce concern for such
life to a platitude, a mere expression of good will that never has efficacy and can
always be trumped.
Again, Robertson insists that once we decide to use embryos in research,
they do become a "mere means." This announces moral equivalence between two
circumstances that I have argued differ relevantly. It is one thing to say that
innocent life "will die" in any case, when one refers to a condition that one did
not, by one's own hands, bring about, and that in most instances one cannot alter.
It is another to say that innocent life will die at one's own hands, a condition that
one plans and brings about from the beginning, and where one could have done
otherwise. This latter procedure does reduce embryos to a menial status. We
would distort the nothing is lost principle beyond recognition if we extended it to
say that nothing is lost when we create an entity whose prospects are nil because
of what we intend from the start.
Robertson's position leads me to ask how much remains of the injunction to
treat persons as ends in themselves when we allow research on frozen and
eventually-to-be-discarded embryos. Some seek to bear witness to the dignity of
embryos by refusing to do anything to them other than freeze them. They adhere
to the norm that one does best to considerfirst what one does and forebears, and
not simply what will happen. Although I find this norm persuasive across a range
of other circumstances, I find here that such a witness threatens to idle. It is
difficult to specify what interests one protects and promotes, for example, when
freezing and discarding are all that one can seriously envisage. To honor
potentiality where there is no hope of implantation is to honor perpetual
potentiality.29 What one can and cannot do in treating persons as ends will be
28. See OUTKA, supra note 23.
29. Brian Sorrells suggested this phrase while reading an earlier draft and I gratefully
appropriate it. That honoring in this case threatens to idle distinguishes it from another sort of case
IX:2 (2009)
14
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol9/iss3/7
"NOTHING IS LOST"
affected by their prospects. Love for an embryo who will live at most in a
perpetually frozen state without self-awareness, has less prospective room than
love for a fetus who is a power underway and who will acquire self-awareness by
virtue of his or her self-development. What we can envisage and do, now and
later, has greater scope in the latter instance, which is why termination obliterates
a future that the fetus now has in prospect, a future that an embryo frozen in
perpetuity itself still lacks.
The injunction retains some force, however, as we disallow the intentional
creation and destruction of embryos as in the case of research cloning. In so
doing, we draw more closely together the moral considerations we weigh in
judging the permissibility of research on fetal cadavers and certain-to-be-
discarded embryos. In both cases, the genetic parents decide whether to donate
them for research. Researchers play a lesser role (they lack a voice in the
decision to abort or to attempt in vitro fertilization) than when they guide the
intentional creation and destruction of embryos.
To extend the nothing is lost principle in the way I do sets a deontological
constraint on "sources" that applies in principle to stem cell research in the public
and private sectors. It draws a line between research on embryos created solely
for this purpose in research cloning, and research on embryos from in vitro
fertilization clinics slated to be discarded or frozen in perpetuity. It disallows the
first sort of research and allows the second. This constraint makes concern about
to which I think the "nothing is lost" appeal does not apply. The latter sort of case assumes a
difference between destruction of an entity for body parts because that entity will die in any event
and using cells from an entity already dead. Some may worry that "nothing is lost" may allow the
general "harvesting" of organs or tissues from the living who are, for example, terminally ill,
permanently comatose, or condemned to die by authorities of the state as criminals. The specter of
Nazi doctors may well appear: if certain people are slated for death anyway, why not experiment on
them to the point of ending their lives to acquire knowledge? (Gilbert Meilaender helpfully posed
this question to me in correspondence.) "Nothing is lost" does not apply to this sort of case. It is
impermissible to destroy any entity for body parts who has an agential history even if he or she
does not now have any considerable future, e.g., entities whose maturity deprives their genetic
parents of authority to end their existence or to elect to donate them for research. Moreover, the
Nazi-doctor analogy fails because even research on camp inmates allows for significant
alternatives. Not only is it less than absolutely certain that the victims will die, but victims
condemned may still be shown kindness and consideration. These alternatives need not and should
not be lost. But we lack any way of showing human kindness to cryopreserved embryos. John
Reeder observes in quoting Baruch Brody that "[tihe basic point of nothing is lost is that, as Brody
puts it, the one to be killed does not 'suffer any significant losses . . . in unrealized potential."'
REEDER, supra note 19, at 62-63 (quoting BARUCH A. BRODY, ABORTION AND THE SANCTITY OF
LIFE: A PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW 151 (1975)). I claim that "unrealized potential" carries for the
embryos in question distinctive finality that resists generalization. (I am indebted to John Reeder,
Richard Fern, and Oliver O'Donovan for discussion of when "nothing is lost" applies and does not
apply.)
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embryos more than an ineffectual afterthought. We should leave the line intact
and be content to derive as many scientific and medical benefits from research on
"excess" embryos as we can.30
The constraint matters then as it marks the drawing of a line. It matters in a
further way. It registers an attitude of ongoing mourning for a plight. We regard
research even on excess embryos as something to which we only reluctantly
acquiesce. This attitude begins in sympathy for those who view their own
infertility as an affliction they seek to overcome. It continues in allowing
unprecedented in vitro technology that sometimes triumphs over this affliction.
But such technology brings one outcome we foresee and lament: namely, the
presence of excess embryos to be discarded or frozen in perpetuity. The case for
extension occurs, once more, in circumstances I take as lamentable. We welcome
neither infertility nor excess embryos. The attitude concludes in a desire that one
day we may get out and get out for good. That is, we look forward to a time when
we may reprogram adult stem cells or otherwise obtain alternative sources of
human pluripotent stem cells so that we no longer require embryos as a source.
Such looking forward disposes me to welcome efforts to obtain pluripotent,
genetically stable, and long-lived human stem cells that do not require creating,
30. Unless we attempt in practice to honor this line, we jeopardize the importance of a moral
distinction that shows how research cloning does instrumentalize in a thoroughgoing way. William
FitzPatrick astutely draws on the intend/foresee distinction to demonstrate this. "In the case of
research cloning, the relation between what is clearly aimed at-the embryo's being disaggregated
to get stem cells-and the purported side effect-the embryo's being destroyed or killed-is 'too
close' to allow for an intelligible application of the intend/foresee distinction." William FitzPatrick,
Surplus Embryos, Nonreproductive Cloning, and the Intend/Foresee Distinction, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., May-June 2003, at 29, 32. Yet I want to accord greater practical stringency than he does to his
assessment that research cloning assumes "an intrinsically inappropriate attitude toward the
beginning stages of human life" that the intend/foresee distinction brings out. Id. at 36. He judges
instead that his assessment "lacks sufficient moral weight to warrant opposing cloning in the end."
Id. at 34. Although he subsequently rebuts several "slippery slope" arguments to which his
allowing cloning are alleged to lead, these consequentialist considerations lack the power of his
earlier deontological assessment. Id. at 35. The point at which I think we may allow room for
maneuver concerns the distinct practice of in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation of embryos.
To invoke the "nothing is lost" principle here means roughly this: we are given a situation (many
embryos are currently frozen in perpetuity). We cannot argue about it, whether or not we lament it.
We must decide in the constrained field that has resulted. "To abstain from research on
cryopreserved embryos" hardly has the same meaning as "to abstain from murder." But
"intentionally to create and destroy embryos for research" has a meaning too similar to murder:
something is lost, deliberately by our own hands, and we treat what is lost entirely as a means. And
so I oppose two discrete kinds of idling. It is idling to refrain from attempting to honor in practice
how the intend/foresee distinction applies to research cloning. It is idling to do nothing but allow
cryopreserved embryos to languish unregarded and doomed, where we cannot show them positive
kindness or otherwise affect their certain prospects.
IX:2 (2009)
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destroying, or harming human embryos. The President's Council on Bioethics, in
a recent white paper,31 has canvassed most usefully four possible approaches, and
Rajesh Rao's Article in this issue describes these and other alternatives to
embryos. 32 I cannot viably consider the ethical debates surrounding these
alternative sources in this Article. But I judge that an appeal to "nothing is lost"
can accommodate three of the sources. These are the following: deriving cells
from organismically dead embryos; deriving cells from specially engineered
biological artifacts (though confining experimentation at present to animal
models); and obtaining cells by somatic cell dedifferentiation (also known as
"reprogramming" or inducing pluripotency). The fourth approach, extracting
blastomeres from living embryos, imposes too many risks on living embryos to
satisfy the "nothing is lost" principle.
33
CONCLUSION
The subject of stem cell research remains volatile. We should beware of
assuming here that once we turn to institutional policies, we no longer need to
engage in "theoretical" debates. On this subject, we are never done with moral
points of departure. These determine, in key part, what we take desirable and
undesirable institutional policies to be. We make claims as I have done here,
weighing arguments about where to place ourselves along a spectrum, how far
judgments about abortion and stem cell research diverge, and so on. If we give
these enduring moral concerns short shrift, we enter the political fray with
undefended assumptions that we merely announce.
To avoid such an outcome, we must not grow weary of moral debates. They
matter, and moral views exert vast influence. Between those who evaluate
embryos as equally protectable human life and those who evaluate embryos as
only "clumps of cells in Petri dishes," there is no peace. I have tried to suggest
why neither of these evaluations is adequate. And I for my part then must
continue to attempt to address conservative and liberal objections.
31. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 23.
32. See Rajesh C. Rao, Alternatives to Embryonic Stem Cells and Cloning: A Brief Scientific
Overview, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 603 (2009).
33. For a detailed review of these conclusions, I am indebted to a paper that Carolyn
Brokowski kindly sent me in response to my attempt to apply the "nothing is lost" principle. For
further detailed scrutiny, see DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, ADVANCING STEM CELL SCIENCE
WITHOUT DESTROYING HUMAN LIFE (2007), available at http://www.montegen.com/Montegen/
Nature-of Business/TheLibrary/Genomics/Stemcells/stemcell_010907.pdf. Special note should
be taken of "induced pluripotent stem cells," or "iPS cells." "These techniques not only avoid any
ethical concerns . . . but they offer a far cheaper and easier method of producing genetically
matched or selected pluripotent stem cells, which makes them appealing to researchers. As a result,
this technique has begun to overtake the use of embryos in many stem-cell labs." Levin, supra note
3, at 17.
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I object to the sort of embryonic stem cell research that creates embryos for
the sake of benefits to third parties, where one embraces the disaggregation of
embryos as necessarily part of what one does from the beginning. To conduct
this research clashes directly with the judgment that entities conceived have
irreducible value. For it is one thing to allow that we need not yet ascribe full
moral standing or equal protectability to embryos. It is another thing to
"instrumentalize" them through and through when what we intend in the actions
we perform exhaustively concerns benefits to third parties. But the claims also
indicate why I object to an ironic alliance that those on the right and left
sometimes form, to the effect that we should either forbid or permit all
embryonic stem cell research. There is, I believe, a more nuanced possibility,
where we may distinguish creating for research and only employing for research.
The latter allows us to consider the tangled aftermath of in vitro fertilization as a
practice in our culture. Employment for research connects with the datum of
discarded embryos, where the original creation of embryos possesses a non-
instrumentalist rationale (namely, the promotion of fertility), so that what we
intend does not exhaustively concern benefit to third parties. The aftermath for
discarded embryos allows us to pursue benefits to third parties when we may do
so without, from the start, creating embryos and where we embrace their
disaggregation as necessarily part of what we do. These differences lead me to
argue that the nothing is lost principle illuminates a morally significant
distinction between creation for research and employment for research. That both
houses of Congress have twice passed bills along these very lines, which were
vetoed by President Bush, indicates that many on the left and the right consider
this a cogent moral position that should be given political and legal effect.34
Whether or not the Congress under President Obama abandons this distinction de
facto, it still retains moral force.
34. The first bill was the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, which the House
passed in May of 2005. In July on 1996, the Senate also passed the act, but Bush vetoed it the same
month. See Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. (2005). The
second bill was vetoed in June of 2007. See Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2007, S. 5,
110th Cong. (2007). The grounds for President Bush's opposition to both bills flow from his
August 9, 2001 speech on stem cell research. I note however that I developed my argument on the
analytical and moral merits of the case well before these events, in an article whose substance I
extend here. Gene Outka, The Ethics of Human Stem Cell Research, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHics J.
175-213 (2002). Christiana Peppard and Brian Sorrells have encouraged me to register these
political developments, and for this and other suggestions I have incorporated, I thank them both.
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